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‘Breach of Duty Causing Harm?’ 
Recent Encounters between 
Negligence and Risk
Jenny Steele*
Introduction—Visions of Negligence 
and Current Challenges
Through analysis of three important recent cases, this lecture explores
fundamental questions about the essential criteria of the tort of negli-
gence, and most particularly the role of ‘damage’. It argues that certain
current problems can be best understood by accepting that the tort of
negligence is typically concerned with allocation of the risk of accidental
damage. This core concern of the tort of negligence is best reflected in an
integrated approach to the various components of the tort, including
both duty and damage.
The criterion of damage is essential to the tort of negligence. Damage
has even been called the ‘gist’ of the tort. In the absence of damage, ‘neg-
ligence’ is not actionable. Breach of duty without damage (like carelessness
without breach of duty) does not ‘assume the legal quality of negligence’ at
all, according to Lord Macmillan in Donoghue v Stevenson ([1932] AC
562, 618–9):
The law takes no cognizance of carelessness in the abstract. It concerns itself with
carelessness where there is a duty to take care and where failure in that duty has
* My thanks are due to Nick Wikeley, Jon Montgomery, Kit Barker, Rob Merkin, and
Telford for input of various sorts. They may not agree with all  of the views expressed.
 Chester v Afshar [2004] UKHL 41, [2005] 1 AC 134; Barker v Corus [2006] UKHL
20, [2006] 2 WLR 1027; In re Pleural Plaques (also reported under the name Rothwell v
Chemical and Insulating Company Limited) [2006] EWCA Civ 27, (2006) 4 All ER 1161.
 See J Stapleton, ‘The Gist of Negligence: Part 2’ (1988) 104 Law Quarterly Review,
389; also by the same author, ‘Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences’
(2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 388–425. Other torts requiring damage include mis-
feasance in a public office (Watkins v Home Office [2006] UKHL 17, [2006] 2 AC 395,
Karagozlu v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] EWCA Civ 1691), and the
‘economic torts’ (with the exception of inducing breach of contract). It is by no means clear
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caused damage. In such circumstances carelessness assumes the legal quality of
negligence and entails consequences in [the] law of negligence.
The dividing line between torts of damage and torts that are actionable
‘per se’ (without proof of damage) is likely to grow in significance given
the influence of the Human Rights Act 1998. For example, there is pres-
sure to provide remedies through tort law—not just through actions
under the Human Rights Act itself—where interests associated with or
akin to ‘Convention rights’ have not been respected. The relationship
between these interests, and recognized forms of ‘damage’ and protected
interests in the law of tort, is not straightforward. Such developments
remaind us that the tort of negligence is in no sense representative of the
law of tort in general. Negligence is concerned with carelessly inflicted
loss or damage, where this is caused through breach of a duty of care.
Other torts exist which respond to quite different states of affairs. For
example, there are torts that turn not on carelessly inflicted harm but on
unlawfulness (of physical contact or restraint, for example) whether this
leads to actual damage or not; on intentionally caused harm; on abuse of
power or process; or on actions inconsistent with proprietary rights. In
addressing the relationship between the law of tort, and remedies for
invasions of Convention rights, increasing attention is likely to be
focused on these variations. For example, the tort of ‘malicious procure-
ment of a search warrant’ is apt to protect interests which are within the
Convention right stated in Article 8 ECHR, but it does so only on proof
of ‘malice’. In Keegan v Home Office [2003] EWCA Civ 936, the Court of
Appeal declined to modify the requirement of ‘malice’ in this tort, where
rights under Article 8 were engaged.
Experience of damages awards under the Human Rights Act is also
likely to focus attention on the contrasting nature of compensatory dam-
ages in the law of tort. Damages for violations of Convention rights are
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that ‘damage’ ought to be defined in the same way in all torts, since it may play a different
role in each.
 This issue was closely analysed by the House of Lords in Watkins v Home Office
(above), with the conclusion that interference with a ‘constitutional right’ (itself a con-
tested term) is not sufficient to fulfil the requirement of damage for the purposes of mis-
feasance in a public office. Neither can it justify waiving the damage requirement.
 Examples in each category are trespass to the person; the action in Wilkinson v
Downton and the economic torts; misfeasance in a public office, malicious prosecution,
malicious procurement of a search warrant; trespass to land and goods (respectively).
 In Keegan v UK (2006), the European Court of Human Rights determined that Article
8 was violated and that the failure to provide a domestic remedy in this case constituted a
violation of Article 13. The facts of Keegan v Home Office arose before commencement of the
Human Rights Act 1998. There would now potentially be a remedy under that Act.
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more limited than tort damages both in terms of quantum and in terms of
availability. All things considered, greater familiarity with actions designed
to vindicate rights is likely to work against the previously popular idea that
‘tort’ should be rationalized under a single set of principles—modelled, no
doubt, on negligence. It will enhance awareness of tort functions outside
the ‘welfare function’ which has been closely associated with negligence.
In summary, the law of tort has a variety of concerns and tort should
not be conflated with negligence. This is becoming clearer in the Human
Rights Act era. But our key point is that negligence in particular is con-
cerned chiefly with accidental damage, and its distinctive character can be
best understood in the light of this.
The components of a negligence action
It can be said to be ‘trite law’ that liability in negligence has a series of
requirements, all of them equally necessary. The following statement
serves as an example:
It is trite that there are five requirements for the tort of negligence: (1) the exist-
ence in law of a duty of care; (2) breach of that duty; (3) damage; (4) a causal
connection between the defendant’s careless conduct and the damage; and (5) the
particular kind of damage not being too remote . . .
Admittedly, with the final requirement, it is impossible to maintain any
convincing pretence of simplicity. There is no agreement on the best way
of expressing this ‘remoteness’ component (let alone what it means).
Some suggest we should ask whether the damage is ‘within the scope of
the duty’ (see in particular Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in South Australia
Asset Management Company v York Montagu [1997] AC 191 (‘SAAMCO’)).
This is an updated version of the ‘risk principle’ adopted in The Wagon
Mound,	 which was then regarded as turning on reasonable foreseeability.

In the Wagon Mound, the Privy Council held that a defendant in breach of
a duty of care is liable only for those consequences which are a foreseeable
consequence of the breach of duty. ‘Foreseeability’ at that time appeared
to be the main element in justifying the existence of a duty of care, and the
Jenny Steele298
 See B Rudden, ‘Torticles’ (1991–2) 6/7 Tulane Civil Law Forum 105, listing around
70 known torts and proposing that the variations (being the product of historical accident)
ought to be rationalized, or perhaps removed.
 Ward LJ, Corr v IBC [2006] EWCA Civ 331, [2006] 3 WLR 395, at [8].
	 Overseas Tankship v Mort’s Dock Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound) [1961] 3 KB 560.

 See also M Stauch, ‘Risk and Remoteness of Damage in Negligence’ (2001) 64
Modern Law Review 191–214, who explicitly links ‘scope of duty’ analysis with an updated
risk principle.
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extent of recoverable damage was deliberately defined by reference to the
‘risk’ which justified the imposition of the duty. In more recent years, it
has become obvious that a wider range of factors is relevant in determin-
ing whether a duty exists, and these factors are marshalled in terms of the
Caparo ‘three stage test’. In an ‘advice’ case, for example, the purpose for
which advice is known to be required (and may reasonably be relied
upon) is relevant to the question of whether the duty arises, given the use
made of the statement by the claimant. Not surprisingly, these reasons for
imposing the duty are also relevant to the question of which damage is
recoverable. While the duty is (in terms of its content) a duty to take care,
the risk thereby shifted to defendants in the event of breach is restricted.
It is restricted for the same reasons that a foreseeability approach was
adopted in The Wagon Mound: the extent of recoverable damage should
reflect the risk against which the defendant ought to have protected the
claimant; which is also the risk that can fairly be allocated to the defend-
ant in the event of breach.
Others argue that analysis in terms of the ‘scope of the duty’ is nonsens-
ical or circular. Instead, it must be asked whether the damage is within
‘the scope of liability for consequences’, an idea which separates ques-
tions about the definition of recoverable damage (and liability) from ideas
about the definition of duty. Like the ‘risk principle’ and ‘scope of duty
analysis’, this ‘scope of liability’ approach also seeks to determine the
‘remoteness’ issue without reference to causal language. But it does not
take an integrated approach to the criteria. We will return to this alterna-
tive approach in the discussion below.
It is notable that ‘damage’ is a distinct requirement in its own right. The
criterion of damage has been the least emphasized of the requirements of
negligence, becoming rather submerged in the requirements that damage
must be ‘caused by’ the breach, and that it must be not too ‘remote’. In
two of the cases explored here (Barker v Corus, and In re Pleural Plaques),
the nature of recoverable damage—in the latter case, material or suffi-
cient damage specifically—was of central importance. In Chester v Afshar,
the judgments proceeded for the most part on the basis that the nature
of the damage was obvious (after all, the claimant had suffered severe
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 J Stapleton, ‘Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences’, above at n 2.
 This point was made, and an important move made to redress the balance, by Jane
Stapleton, in ‘The Gist of Negligence: Part 2’, above at n 2. More recently, the emergence
of novel forms of damage in the tort of negligence have been considered by C Witting,
‘Physical Damage in Negligence’ (2002) 61(1) Cambridge Law Journal 189–208, and 
D Nolan, ‘New Forms of Damage in Negligence’ (2007) 70(1) Modern Law Review 59–88.
See the discussion of Chester v Afshar, below.
10-Holder-3-Chap10.qxd  09-10-2007  05:06 PM  Page 299
 at J B M
orrell Library, University of York on February 10, 2011
clp.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
personal injury). Lord Hoffmann addressed the possibility that the
damage ‘caused by’ the breach of duty was not in fact the physical injury,
but his analysis of the link between breach of duty and eventual damage
was incomplete. Had a very slightly different analysis been adopted, the
nature of the protected interest and of recoverable damage, rather than
the criteria for showing factual causation, might have been recognized as
the real questions to arise from the case.
Breach of duty, or accidental damage?
Why did we begin by drawing attention to the full set of criteria for an
action in negligence, particularly given that we stated them to be a matter
of ‘trite law’? Two very different interpretations of the tort of negligence
are at large, giving different weight to different halves of the ‘trite’ negli-
gence formula: breach of duty on the one hand; and causation of (‘not too
remote’) material damage on the other. One of these approaches takes
damage very seriously; the other concentrates far more on the breach of
duty, and at best treats damage as a separate criterion. In some variations
it does not treat damage as a criterion of the action in negligence at all,
maintaining that compensation for damage is just one potential response
to a breach of the duty to take care.
Taking damage very seriously
The first of these two broad approaches takes damage very seriously as an
integral aspect of the tort. This approach observes that at least since
Donoghue v Stevenson, the tort of negligence has been moulded by the fact
that it is the chief tort of accidental loss or damage. Indeed, this argument
can be developed further, because the concern with accidental damage
explains some of the reasons for the very dominance of negligence in
modern tort law.
Jenny Steele300
 N J McBride, ‘Duties of Care—Do They Really Exist?’ (2004) 24 (3) Oxford Journal
of Legal Studies 417–441. McBride declares himself to be an ‘idealist’ about duties of care.
He argues that they are ‘real’ in that they actually impose obligations to be careful (not just
to compensate injured parties in the event of breach). Notably, the ‘idealist’ lawyer in his
article, when advising a client company that it must comply with the duty to take care
(there, a duty to recall a defective product), declines to offer any comment to the client on
the liabilities that are likely to follow if the duty is breached, nor does the lawyer advise the
client that these consequences will only follow if harm is caused. This is related to
McBride’s promotion of non-compensatory damages and of injunctions against continu-
ing negligence. Notably, the example is a case of deciding whether to abide by a duty to take
care (reflecting on whether or not to take a particular step in order to protect consumers):
it is not the usual case of ‘inadvertent’ negligence (n 17 and accompanying text, below).
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Negligence has come to be at the centre of tort lawyers’ consciousness
partly because there is a lot of accidental damage around. Such damage is
a social problem and tort liability, primarily through the tort of negli-
gence, is one component in our current response to this problem. Tony
Weir has suggested that many jurists think of negligence as the ‘paradigm
tort’, ‘for no better reason than that a great many people are mangled on
the highway’. This apparently throw-away remark is offered to a serious
purpose: Weir was in the process of contrasting the tort of negligence with
the actions in trespass, which do not depend on carelessness but primar-
ily on unlawfulness. He expressly pointed out that preoccupation with
negligence typically means preoccupation with issues of safety, which are
not at the core of the trespass torts. ‘If a defendant can say that he acted
reasonably, a negligence lawyer will let him off, without bothering to dis-
tinguish the reasonable but erroneous belief that the projected behaviour
was authorised from the reasonable but erroneous belief that it was safe.’
A further practical reason why concern with ‘accidental’ damage
puts negligence at the core of modern tort law is that such damage will be
covered by the typical liability insurance policy, while more deliberate
acts (such as fraud or wilful violence) will generally be excluded. So a
claimant who seeks compensation (as many do) will typically be well
advised to express his or her claim in terms of negligence, unless the
defendant has deep enough pockets to cover an uninsured liability.
This first view of negligence is often expressed in terms of allocation of
risks. For the most part, negligence deals with losses that were a foresee-
able result of the defendant’s negligence but which were not desired by
the defendant in any sense. This view depends, to some extent, on
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 T Weir, A Casebook on Tort (10th edn) (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2004), at 322–3.
 ibid.
 On the other hand, vicarious liability for violent or indecent assaults, for example,
may be interpreted as within the employer’s insurance policy. In Hawley v Luminar [2006]
EWCA Civ 18, (2006) IRLR 817, it was held that a violent assault committed by a night-
club bouncer was ‘accidental’ for the purposes of the employer’s insurance policy—it was
accidental in respect of the employer, who was the assured party, even though in other
respects (for the purposes of limitation and contribution for example), the employer
‘stands in the shoes of ’ the perpetrator. In KR v Royal Sun Alliance [2006] EWCA Civ
1454, insurance policies which excluded cover for deliberate acts by ‘the assured’, were held
to exclude liability for acts of sexual abuse by managers and directors. The policies were
interpreted, however, as not excluding liability for acts of sexual abuse by ordinary employ-
ees, as opposed to managers and directors. Such ordinary employees were not the ‘assured’.
 It seems obvious that a duty to take care could be breached through deliberate behav-
iour. For example, deliberate bad driving is a breach of the duty of care owed to other road
users at least as much as inadvertent bad driving. But it must be said that trespass cases such
as Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232 and (particularly) Stubbings v Webb [1993] AC 498
are a barrier to this obvious conclusion. It is expected that the latter case will be closely
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recognition that carelessness itself is a generally foreseeable event. Equally,
that ‘negligence’ (carelessness) cannot be entirely eradicated while retain-
ing mutually beneficial activities in which it is an unavoidable attendant
hazard.
From the point of view of this first approach, the criterion of damage is
obviously vital. Until Barker v Corus, it appeared that at least in personal
injury cases ‘allocation of risk’ meant that, if the criteria of the tort were ful-
filled, the defendant was liable to compensate the claimant for the actual
damage that was suffered—provided that was ‘within the relevant risk’. As
we will see, Barker v Corus seems to adopt the different possibility that the
damage that is caused by the breach may be less than the damage that is
suffered by the claimant. In retrospect, there are other cases that make a
similar move, including SAAMCO, for example. Arguably, Barker simply
applies the logic of SAAMCO in that it defines the relevant risk as some-
thing less than the damage suffered. But Barker is a personal injury case
concerning fatal disease, and application of the logic of SAAMCO to such
a case is a novel development. It is true that certain injuries and diseases
have previously been interpreted as ‘divisible’ into parts caused and parts
not caused by a particular defendant,	 but this is an entirely different mat-
ter. Equally, the first two cases examined here (Chester and Barker) show
very clearly that ‘scope of duty’ analysis is never purely an exercise in logic.
On this first view of negligence, the measure of damages is compen-
satory for the simple reason that this is what it means to allocate a risk. If
damage within the risk occurs, that damage is borne by the defendant. If it
does not occur, there is no tort (and no legal consequence through the law
of tort). This much was stated by Lord Macmillan in Donoghue v
Stevenson, as noted above. Recent cases take a more nuanced and purposive
approach to duty, and therefore a more nuanced view of the relevant risk.
Risk spreading
We cannot leave this model of negligence as it stands. Before moving to a
second approach to negligence, we should note that a ‘risk allocation
model’ of negligence tends to lead to other thoughts about risks. It is clear
Jenny Steele302
examined by the House of Lords when it hears the appeal from A v Hoare [2006] EWCA
Civ 395, (2006) 1 WLR 2320.
 Or to quote Tony Weir again, ‘Errare Humanum Est’: see T Weir, ‘Errare Humanum
Est’, in P Birks (ed), The Frontiers of Liability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
B A Hepple, ‘Negligence: The Search for Coherence’ [1997] CLP 69–94, captures this idea
in terms of the rise of ‘inadvertent negligence’.
	 Thompson v Smiths Shiprepairers (North Shields) Ltd [1984] QB 405; Holtby v Brigham
and Cowan [2000] 3 All ER 421; Allen v British Rail Engineering Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 242.
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that risks, once allocated, do not always stay put. Risk allocation is typically
the precursor to risk spreading. People pass risks on, mostly through insur-
ance, though also through the pricing of goods and services. Risk spread-
ing is not only permitted, nor even merely encouraged, but in certain key
contexts is actually required, through compulsory liability insurance.

For many reform-minded tort lawyers, the step to risk spreading through
liability insurance (particularly but not only where that is compulsory)
marks a step from personal responsibility to social responsibility.This step
changes the whole subject. There are challenges now to this view that
liability insurance signifies social responsibility. The more important of these
challenges tend to reflect broader social change and have been most clearly
understood from within the ‘social responsibility’ view itself. The broader
change of scene of which this forms part can be explained in terms of dis-
course about risk more generally. ‘Risk spreading’ (which is collective and
mutual) has turned out to be a precursor to something much less collective
and mutual. This next stage has been described by Baker and Simon in terms
of ‘embrace of risk’. Embrace of risk incorporates ideas about personal
responsibility for risk planning and risk avoidance, and about the limited
capacity of insurance to resolve problems of damage and loss. It is
important to notice that these developments are emanations of the risk
distribution model, and are not simple returns to an old-fashioned idea of
individualism. They proceed from consideration of societal responses to risk,
and consider the implications of this for personal responsibility (for risk
avoidance and risk planning, rather than the consequences of individual
action), solidarity or selectiveness, and social justice.
The risk allocation view—with or without the additional interest in
risk distribution—could be called the dominant one. But there is a
second perspective which does not accept the risk allocation view even of
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
 In particular Road Traffic Act 1988, section 143; Employers’ Liability (Compulsory
Insurance) Act 1969. The practical impact of compulsory insurance on tort is assessed by
R Lewis, ‘How Important Are Insurers in Compensating Claims for Personal Injury in the
UK?’ (2006) 31 The Geneva Papers 323–339.  Hepple, n 17 above.
 It also, quite commonly, leads to recommendations for wholesale reform of personal
injury law.
 Hepple, n 17 above, and P Atiyah, ‘Personal Injuries in the Twenty-First Century:
Thinking the Unthinkable’, in P Birks (ed), Wrongs and Remedies in the Twenty-First
Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
 T Baker and J Simon, Embracing Risk: The Changing Culture of Insurance and
Responsibility (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), Introduction.
 J Steele, Risks and Legal Theory (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004).
 McBride suggests that nearly all English textbook writers on tort adopt this view. See
N J McBride, ‘Duties of Care—Do They Really Exist?’ (2004) 24(3) Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies, 417–41.
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negligence law, and not even in respect of its core cases of accidental
damage. This view is gaining currency.
A more normative approach to negligence duties
The second perspective favours the ‘breach of duty’ aspect. From this
second perspective, the integrated approach, adopting a risk allocation
model, does not take sufficiently seriously the role of duties in requiring
or prohibiting certain behaviour. On one version, the risk allocation model
is accused of treating negligence duties as only being about allocation of
losses. It may as well say that no primary duties to take care exist at all—
the only duty is a duty to compensate, if ‘fault’ causes damage. Because
the risk allocation approach (above) treats negligence on a continuum
with other ways of allocating or spreading risk, it may not even treat
negligence as a part of the law of wrongs at all.
This second approach emphasizes the normative nature of tort duties.
Negligence is part of a continuum not with other risk allocation mech-
anisms but with other civil wrongs. On some versions, this approach is
equivocal about the damage requirement. It treats negligence chiefly in
terms of right and wrong behaviour, rather than accidental harm. The
damage requirement can be an impediment to taking duty seriously
enough, and (one aspect of this) it tends to restrict the suitable remedies.
As we saw, the risk allocation model holds that the measure of damages
will (prima facie) be compensatory—if the risk eventuates, the party in
breach will pay for the consequences. If the function of negligence is,
instead, primarily to determine what parties are obliged to do (simply, to
take care), then the remedies may well be more flexible. Punishment and
deterrence may loom large.
The late Peter Birks, for example, criticized contemporary tort schol-
arship (and tort law) for its exclusive preoccupation with the ‘welfare’
function of tort.	 Part of his criticism related to the limitation of tort
remedies to ‘mere’ compensatory damages. As he argued, ‘the welfare-
oriented system of civil liability’ failed ‘to meet the victim’s need for satis-
faction where there really has been outrageous and malicious behaviour’.
He bemoaned the fact that the House of Lords had ‘confined the civil law,
Jenny Steele304
 See McBride, ibid.
 So, McBride and Bagshaw treat the action in Rylands v Fletcher (like liability under
the Consumer Protection Act 1987) as an ‘alternative source of compensation’, outside the
law of tort. See N J Bride and R Bagshaw, Tort Law (2nd edn) (London: Longman, 2005),
Ch 44.
	 P Birks, ‘Editor’s Preface’, Wrongs and Remedies in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1996).
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anomalies aside, to the compensatory function’.
 In fact from the point
of view of a study of accidental damage, full compensatory damages are
inclined to look rather excessive. But Professor Birks also wanted the
‘normative’ element of tort law as a whole to be more widely accepted.
Civil wrongs, he argued, should be seen on a continuum with criminal
law as a source of duties and obligations:
The law relating to civil wrongs has two aspects. One, encapsulated in the notion
of compensation for loss, aligns it with social security. The other, more powerfully
normative, emphasizes its exhortatory and retributive function. From the latter
standpoint the law of wrongs, civil and criminal, forms a single social project, for
deterring disapproved behaviour and avenging its victims.
One difficulty with applying this approach to negligence in particular is
that ‘inadvertent negligence’ (the usual kind) is common, entirely human,
and impossible to eradicate fully from a wide range of desired activities.
That is indeed one of the reasons why not all failures to take care assume
the ‘legal quality’ of negligence (in Lord Macmillan’s expression), even if
they result in foreseeable damage. In effect, courts ask whether there are
grounds for placing the risk of negligently caused harm with the defendant.
They adopt a risk allocation approach. The decision whether to allocate the
risk depends on many factors, which are channelled into the ‘duty of care’
enquiry. The nature of the risk whose allocation to the defendant is thought
to be justified in this way cannot be expected to be wholly irrelevant when
determining the range of compensable damage.
Recent Encounters between Negligence and Risk 305

 Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129. Although more recently the House of Lords in
Kuddus v Chief Constable of Leicestershire [2002] 2 AC 122 removed the ‘cause of action’
limitation for exemplary damages, it did not do so out of great enthusiasm for exemplary
damages and Lord Scott in particular was tempted to abolish them altogether. On the other
hand Lord Hutton thought they were of particular use for civil liberties torts, and this
reinforces our earlier argument that such cases may restore to prominence a less welfare-
oriented function for some aspects of tort law.
 See P Atiyah, ‘Personal Injuries in the Twenty-First Century: Thinking the
Unthinkable’, in P Birks (ed), Wrongs and Remedies in the Twenty-First Century
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). As we have noted, tort damages may also appear high
when compared with damages under the Human Rights Act 1998. See the Law
Commission’s recent discussion of monetary remedies in claims against public bodies:
Law Commission, Remedies Against Public Bodies: A Scoping Report (London: Law
Commission, 2006).
 See Birks, above at n 28, vi. It seems important to note in passing that this is also a
controversial statement of the purposes of criminal law. Indeed, the risk-based approach to
tort law (or, more properly, the tort of negligence) has been a significant influence on
developing a theory of ‘actuarial justice’ in respect of criminal law: see most recently 
M Feeley, ‘Origins of Actuarial Justice’, in S Armstrong and L McAra (eds), Perspectives on
Punishment: The Origins of Control (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).
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An integrated approach
This last point underlines the value of an integrated approach to the essential
criteria of negligence. This approach treats the various criteria—breach of
duty, and causation of actionable damage within the risk (or scope of
duty)—as closely related. Duty is important to this model, but not in a way
that would satisfy the more purely ‘normative’ approach. It holds that the
nature of the duty of care itself can only be understood with some reference
to the consequences of breach—both in terms of damage to the claimant, and
in terms of liability for that damage. Indeed the likely consequences are a key
consideration in deciding whether a duty is imposed. The integrated
approach is a risk allocation approach, and it is exemplified by key cases such
as Donoghue and Caparo, as well as SAAMCO and The Wagon Mound.
The main judicial proponent of a strongly integrated approach to duty
and damage has been Lord Hoffmann. In particular, Lord Hoffmann has
developed an approach in which the range of recoverable losses is deter-
mined partly by the purpose and scope of the duty of care in a particular case.
This gives us special reasons for focusing upon the dissenting judgment of
Lord Hoffmann in Chester v Afshar, as well as his opinions in Fairchild and
(in the majority) in Barker v Corus. ‘Scope of duty analysis’ has been criti-
cized as both subtle, and subjectively evaluative. This is not necessarily a
decisive argument against it, but it will be important to identify the evalu-
ative elements at work, especially where they are obscured by apparent exer-
cises in logic. This is especially important in relation to Barker v Corus, where
the criticism (that scope of duty analysis hides evaluative judgments) hits
home hard. More fundamentally, the approach has also been criticized as
‘circular’. This is an argument against integration of negligence criteria. I
hope to illustrate that although scope of duty analysis is evaluative, and can-
not answer all questions that might be referred to as ‘remoteness’ questions,
nevertheless some (very important) issues and problems can be illuminated
through analysis of the scope and purpose of the duty imposed on the
defendant. These are not merely circular or nonsensical ideas. Our approach
therefore is to suggest that ‘scope of duty’ or ‘scope of risk’ analysis is both
potentially useful (in clarifying the nature of the problems faced), and poten-
tially dangerous (if allowed to hide the evaluative nature of solutions
adopted, behind a façade of apparent logic).
Lord Hoffmann has recently expressed acceptance that the lan-
guage of ‘scope of duty’ is misleading and should change. Perhaps as a
Jenny Steele306
 See in particular his exercise in ‘scope of duty analysis’ in SAAMCO.
 See J Stapleton, ‘Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences’, n 2 above.
 ibid.
 L Hoffmann, ‘Causation’ (2005) 121 Law Quartely Review 592–603.
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consequence, the expression ‘scope of duty’ does not appear in his
judgments in the cases considered here, although other judges have
adopted it. But it will be suggested that interpretation of the purpose of
the duty is one of the determining factors in the judgments explored and
partly defines the nature of the damage that is thought to be recoverable.
Whether or not the expression ‘scope of duty’ is used, this is an integrated
approach and unpacking this can help to illuminate some of the puzzles
encountered in these cases.
Central to this integrated approach is that the duty of care is to be under-
stood as a duty to avoid some particular consequence (or damage to some
particular interest). It is not simply a duty to take care, but to take care not to
expose the claimant to certain risks. This approach is evidently risk-based. As
we have said, it updates the ‘risk principle’ of The Wagon Mound. The main
rival to this view is, as we have seen, the idea that a duty of care simply requires
the person under the duty to be careful. Consequences are dealt with by an
entirely separate set of rules relating to remedies. This is hard to reconcile
with the words of Lord Macmillan in Donoghue v Stevenson quoted towards
the start of this lecture, and with significant intervening cases. Although the
latter interpretation of negligence duties is chiefly associated with an
approach to negligence which downplays its role in dealing with accidental
damage, it is worth noting that Jane Stapleton’s very influential writings
seem to take a hybrid form from this point of view. Damage, according to
Stapleton, is the ‘gist’ of the tort of negligence. But at the same time, the
only meaningful interpretation of the ‘scope’ of a duty of care is that it
obliges the party subject to the duty to be appropriately careful.	
In summary, the argument over an integrated approach to the criteria
of the tort of negligence tends to reflect debate about the very purpose
and function of the tort as outlined above. The integrated approach is a
risk allocation approach. The normative approach to duties by contrast
requires separation of the criteria, and this is bound up with rejection of
the idea that negligence is concerned with allocation of risk. Separation of
the criteria has also been urged on the different grounds that integration
hides evaluative judgments (which it certainly may) and is merely circular
(which we will suggest it is not).
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 The expression occurs in the opinion of Lord Walker in Chester v Afshar, and Lord
Hope in the same case uses the analogous expression ‘scope of the risk’. Both Ward LJ and
Wilson LJ used the expression ‘scope of duty’ in Corr v IBC [2006] 3 WLR 395, although
they did not find it useful for disposing of that case. It seems to be putting it too strongly to
call the expression ‘discredited’, as does Stapleton: see J Stapleton, ‘Occam’s Razor Reveals
an Orthodox Basis for Chester v Afshar’ (2006) 122 (Jul) Law Quarterly Review 426–448.
 J Stapleton, ‘The Gist of Negligence: Part 2’, above at n 2.
	 J Stapleton, ‘Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences’, above at n 2.
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The Case Law in Brief—The Role of Risk
All of the cases discussed here have some connection with risk; but we will
have to decide what that connection is. We should also note that the cases
involve not only negligence but also claims for breach of statutory duty.
The issues in connection with this action are substantially similar to those
that arise in respect of the negligence action. If anything, the integration
claim is all the stronger (or more obvious) in connection with the action
in tort for breach of statutory duty. The duty in question clearly ‘exists’
whether it is actionable in tort or not, in the sense that the relevant statute
‘obliges’ the defendant to act in a particular way. For example, penalties
may attach to breach of the duty, or there may be scope for judicial review.
But a remedy is available in tort only if it is thought that appropriate
Parliamentary intent is present. At the very least, it must be thought that
Parliament intended the duty to be for the benefit of the claimant, in the
sense of protecting the claimant from the type of harm that actually came
about (Groves v Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402). The definition of the type
of harm, as well as the relevant class of claimants, is essential to the deci-
sion that the breach is actionable at common law (see also Gorris v Scott
1874 LR 9 Exch 125).
As part of her argument against an integrated approach, Jane Stapleton
has sought to make a sharp distinction between statutory duties, and
negligence duties, in this respect. She argues that it makes sense to discuss
statutory duties as having the avoidance of a particular ‘mischief ’ as their
purpose, but that to suggest there is a specific ‘purpose’ to a tort duty
(beyond imposing a duty to be careful) ‘is no more than a crude boot-
straps argument’.
 We have already proposed that this is not the case,
since negligence duties are defined partly in terms of the consequences of
breach. The explicit terms in which courts decide whether a duty of care
is owed also make it quite unconvincing to maintain that duties of care in
negligence can never be said to have a specific ‘purpose’ which can be
gleaned from the relevant case law.
Chester v Afshar
Chester concerned a failure to advise of risks. I prefer to say ‘advise’ rather
than ‘warn’ because warnings aim to make people safe, or enable them to
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 J Stapleton, ‘Occam’s Razor Reveals An Orthodox Basis for Chester v Afshar’, at n 36
above, at 434.
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choose safety. On the particular facts of Chester v Afshar, the failure to
advise did not make the claimant less safe. This lay behind what was
perceived to be the ‘causal problem’ (which was however not entirely
clearly identified). The case can help us to understand a great deal about
the relationship between the action in negligence, risks, and damage. It
also illustrates the benefits and the limitations of scope of duty analysis.
Barker v Corus
Barker v Corus concerned several claims in respect of fatal cancers
sustained, almost certainly, as a result of occupational exposures to
asbestos dust. The only connection with the disease that could be shown
against any given employer on balance of probabilities was that their
breach of duty had increased the risk of contracting the disease. On the
face of it, the majority in Barker held the defendants liable for an increase
in the risk of injury, rather than for the injury itself. The increased risk
was the relevant ‘damage’ which was caused by the breach of duty (even
if it was not the damage suffered by the claimant), and compensation
was to be assessed accordingly. We question below whether this can be
taken entirely literally. But the degree of consistency between Lord
Hoffmann’s dissenting judgment in Chester, and his leading majority
judgment in Barker, is interesting. In Chester the failure to advise did
not increase the risk of injury and Lord Hoffmann argued (in dissent)
that the breach had not caused the injury. In Barker the defendant 
had increased the risk and Lord Hoffmann (together with Lords Scott
and Walker) thought this increase itself could, within the ambit of
the Fairchild exception and subject to other provisos, stand in as damage.
Is this a departure from the ‘risk principle’ (updated by scope of duty
analysis), or an application of it?
In respect of mesothelioma, the actual effect of Barker was very quickly
reversed by section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006. We will explore the
reasons of justice and fairness behind this reversal; and also explore the
potential for Barker to retain an influence in the law’s development.
In re Pleural Plaques
At this time of writing the final case has not yet arrived in the House of
Lords. It concerns another series of claims concerning occupational
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exposure to asbestos dust, but the injury sustained by the claimants is
quite different. By a majority, the Court of Appeal rejected the idea that
exposure to risk was damage sufficient for an action in negligence (in
this case, the risk was of future disease). It also rejected a claim that such
a risk amounted to damage when combined with physical changes
which were themselves too ‘trivial’ to be actionable. And the Court of
Appeal further rejected a claim that these two counted as damage when
combined with anxiety brought on by awareness of the physical changes,
which acted as a marker of exposure to risk. None of these three forms
of ‘damage’ being actionable individually, neither were they actionable
in combination. Though the treatment of risk as not damage is appar-
ently at odds with the Barker approach, the cases are of course narrowly
distinguishable. At a more principled level though it may be hard to
explain why risk creation counts as damage in one context but not in
another.
Perhaps this is why all of the majority’s reasons from start to finish
were expressed not in terms of principle but of ‘policy’. Was this an
extreme effort to avoid setting out dangerous statements of principle
which might affect other areas, such as claims for loss of chance in cases
of medical misdiagnosis? If so, the case underlines the extent to which
causal ‘principles’ are becoming much more fragmented and variable as
between different types of case, with the result that it is difficult to draw
distinctions in a particularly convincing way. The Court of Appeal was
treading an uncertain line between Barker, where the gist of the action
was increase in risk because this was all that could be proved, and the
medical negligence cases of Hotson v E Berkshire AHA [1987] AC 750
and Gregg v Scott [2005] UKHL 2; [2005] 2 AC 176, where loss of a
chance of recovery could not amount to actionable damage, even
though proof of any more than this was impossible for similar reasons.
We will need to ask how convincing the policy reasoning was in this
case, and whether any additional unspoken factors influenced the
majority.
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 Hence the graphic expression, borrowed from counsel and used in the title of an
article by Dominic de Saulles, ‘nought plus nought plus nought equals nought’: see D De
Saulles, ‘Nought Plus Nought Plus Nought Equals Nought: Rhetoric and the Asbestos
Wars’ (2006) 4 Journal of Personal Injury Law 301–36.
 A different strategy to a similar end was adopted by Smith LJ in dissent: on this
analysis, the question of ‘material damage’ is primarily a question of fact, rather than
legal principle.
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The Case Law in More Detail: Duty, Damage, 
or Causation?
Chester v Afshar
Miss Chester had been suffering from chronic back pain for many years,
and this had been ‘conservatively’ treated through a series of injections. Her
doctor finally advised that she should consider surgery, and mentioned
Mr Afshar. Miss Chester had a general fear of surgery. She consulted Mr
Afshar, who (it seems) did not mention to her the small (1–2%) risk of
major complications which was inherent in the surgery proposed. These
complications were realized, and Miss Chester was left with serious impair-
ments of bodily movement to an extent that was yet to be finally deter-
mined. The case was treated, in effect, as one where the surgeon had failed
to advise a patient of the risks inherent in unavoidable surgery. We need to
consider what is meant by this.
Inherent risks
The risks were inherent in the sense that no amount of care would avoid
them, if the surgery was carried out. We can assume that there is no more
careful and experienced surgeon than Mr Afshar, and that there was no
lack of care in the conduct of the surgery. The risks cannot be lower than
they were when the operation was conducted. The realization of the risk
was, in this specific sense, a matter of mere chance.
Unavoidable surgery
The idea that the surgery was unavoidable is more contested. Jane
Stapleton has argued that surgery is never unavoidable. We are always
entitled to refuse surgery, if we wish to do so—even if this will result in
death—provided we are ‘competent’. Therefore, she does not accept that
in such a case, the risk is not increased by the failure to advise:
Since warned patients may choose never to have the operation, they can affect the
rate of the risk eventuating . . . In medical failure to warn cases, then, the deleteri-
ous outcome of breaches are not coincidental outcomes, as had been the case
in the case of lightening striking the ambulance, because here breaches of the
obligation to warn patients will tend to increase the incidence of the medical risk
occurring.
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But the surgery in this case was not treated by the majority judges as
‘unavoidable’ in any general sense, and the House of Lords did not con-
sider itself to be addressing general questions of what would tend to be the
case. Rather, it was accepted after assessment of the evidence that this par-
ticular claimant would, if fully advised of the risks, have delayed surgery.
But it was also treated as established that Miss Chester would eventually
have relented and undergone the same procedure, facing the same (inher-
ent) risk. It is not simply that the surgeon decided that the surgery was
inevitable. It was found in this particular case, as a matter of fact, that the
particular claimant would eventually have undergone the same surgery,
facing the same risks. It is for this reason that the House of Lords pro-
ceeded on the basis (denied by Jane Stapleton) that the failure to advise
did not increase the risk of the adverse outcome. The failure to advise did not
make the claimant any less safe, because her final decision would have
been to undergo the surgery, which could not have been made any safer.
Between them, these elements of the factual context (the risk was
inherent; and the surgery would on the facts have been undergone any-
way) were taken to mean that the failure to advise did not enhance the risk
faced by the claimant. This factor is all-important. It is the simple reason
why an ‘orthodox’ interpretation of Chester (as Stapleton describes it) is
not possible. If the risk had been increased by the failure to warn, then the
injury suffered would indeed fall within the risk against which the warn-
ing should have protected. Factual causation would be present since the
‘but for’ test is satisfied (an issue explored below); and the injury would
also fall within the ‘risk’ that should have been avoided, or reduced, by
giving a warning. This is in fact a far simpler route to an ‘orthodox’ solu-
tion than Stapleton’s own, because she rejects the worth of the idea that
the damage is ‘within the risk’.
Importantly, Stapleton concedes—from her ‘general’ vantage point—
that if the ‘overall incidence of outcomes’ was not affected by the breach
(which is to say, if risk was not increased by the failure to warn or advise
of the risks), then no such ‘orthodox’ interpretation would be possible.
Further, she concedes that in such a case a remedy would require recogni-
tion that what is protected is the claimant’s autonomy, not her physical
safety. In fact, the duty to warn (advise) would be imposed ‘to protect an
interest not previously protected by the tort of negligence in England’
(Stapleton (2006), at 442). That is indeed the interpretation explored
below. But it seems that in making this point Stapleton slips some way
towards an ‘integrated’ approach, since she thereby concedes that duties
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are to some extent purposive—the duty here would exist ‘to protect’ a
particular interest. Indeed, the tort duty would be defined partly in terms
of the interests which it exists to protect.
The House of Lords took it to be uncontroversial that the failure to
advise was a breach of duty. It has been widely noted that this element of the
case is hard to reconcile with Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital ([1985]
AC 871). It is momentous because it appears to recognize a duty to
obtain genuinely informed consent which has not previously been fully
recognized in English law—and to do so through the tort of negligence
(rather than in trespass to the person, where consent is well established to
be an important element). An attempt could be made to reconcile the case
with Sidaway by explaining that the claimant here is in the special category
of patients who are inquisitive: Sidaway suggested that in such a case, ques-
tions must be answered truthfully. But the House of Lords did not attempt
to do this. Alternatively, it can be argued that the inconsistency between
the cases was the product of a mere concession. The defendant did not
argue that there was no duty to advise of the risk. He argued instead that
he had advised of the risk. But the majority judges made clear that they
were not merely accepting a concession. They strongly endorsed the
importance of the duty to advise in these circumstances.
The central role of duty in Chester
Referring with approval not only to Ronald Dworkin’s analysis of patient
autonomy, but also to Michael Jones’ analysis ‘Informed Consent and
Other Fairy Stories’,	 the majority embraced the existence of an import-
ant duty to give information which will allow the patient to make an
informed choice. This duty is still enforced through liability even if (as
here) the final choice as to whether to undergo the surgery is unlikely to
have been any different. The overriding goal is to prevent the doctor from
making a choice which should lie with the patient. It may be pointed out
that this is not a pointless or unreal exercise, since a patient may have very
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 This is the approach to negligence duties which is rejected as a ‘crude bootstraps
argument’ by Stapleton when she contrasts the action in negligence with breach of statu-
tory duty.
 The risk was very similar in terms of its size and gravity to the one in issue in Sidaway,
where there was held to be no duty to inform.
 R Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia and
Individual Freedom (London: Harper Collins, 1993): see the analysis of Lord Steyn’s
judgment, below.
	 M Jones, ‘Informed Consent and Other Fairy Stories’ (1999) 7 Medical Law Review,
103: see the judgment of Lord Hope.
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different views from the doctor concerning the stage at which her current
situation becomes intolerable, or at which she is sufficiently reconciled
with the risk to undergo surgery.
But it is with the recognition of the duty as protecting the patient’s
autonomy or right to choose that the problems start. What follows may be
complex, but a shorthand version of the reasons may be offered from the
start. Negligence is primarily a tort concerned with safety. The breach of
duty in this case violated the right to choose, rather than making the
claimant any less safe.
The scope of the duty or the nature of the duty was discussed to some
extent by all the majority judges. This in itself suggests that the nature of
the duty to take care was not regarded as exhausted—as both McBride
and Stapleton would propose—by saying that the defendant under the
duty is obliged to take care. At the very least, such duties aim at protect-
ing a particular interest or set of interests. In dissent, Lord Hoffmann
adopted a particular analysis of the duty in this case, as a ‘duty to warn’.
On this analysis, he thought there was a causal problem. We will suggest
that he was probably right about this, although there is some uncertainty
how to categorize that problem. To escape this difficulty, Lord Hoffmann
also considered an alternative, which is that the protected interest was not
safety, but autonomy.
 But he thought damages for the consequential
injury (paralysis) were not available on this analysis. He did not fully
explain why not, and it seems that this conclusion turns on assumptions
about what is ‘within the risk’ addressed by the duty understood in this
way. Notably, the relationship between the protected interest, and the
recoverable damage, is not straightforward if this path is taken. So the case
illustrates both the value of scope of duty analysis (it is not merely circu-
lar); and its limitations. The final stage (should there be liability for all
the consequences?) is evaluative. It is evaluative in the same way that the
decision whether to impose a duty of care is evaluative. It concerns the
definition of the risks that are appropriately allocated to defendants.
The nature of the duty: Lord Steyn’s approach
Lords Hoffmann and Steyn (in the minority and the majority, respect-
ively) each saw that there were two different potential formulations of the
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rect if we ‘pretend’ (or in our case, accept) that the risk is not increased by the failure to
advise.
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duty. Lord Steyn emphasized the ‘autonomy’ version rather than the
‘safety’ version:
[18] . . . A rule requiring a doctor to abstain from performing an operation with-
out the informed consent of a patient serves two purposes. It tends to avoid the
occurrence of the particular physical injury the risk of which a patient is not
prepared to accept. It also ensures that due respect is given to the autonomy and
dignity of each patient.
Lord Steyn then quoted a passage from Dworkin’s Life’s Dominion, which
begins:
The most [plausible] account emphasises the autonomy rather than the welfare
of the choosing agent . . .
Lord Steyn chose to take the ‘autonomy’ path. But he took that path within
the tort of negligence, where (as Stapleton notes) protection of autonomy, as
opposed to welfare, is not traditional. Lord Steyn’s judgment is compelling
in terms of its identification of the purpose of the duty concerned, but rather
less compelling in terms of its treatment of causation questions. He con-
ceded that the case ‘cannot neatly be accommodated within conventional
causation principles’ ([22]), but did not specify why not; and he drew a very
loose analogy with the case of Fairchild v Glenhaven ([2003] 1 AC 32) which,
as we will see, involved an entirely different problem. His conclusion was
that the claimant had not given ‘informed consent’, and therefore:
[24] . . . Her right of autonomy and dignity ought to be vindicated by a narrow
and modest departure from traditional causation principles.
He did not identify what that departure was; nor did he indicate why
vindication of a right to autonomy justifies compensatory damages
assessed in terms of consequential personal injury. So in a sense there is
little that can be gleaned from Lord Steyn’s reasoning, other than the
dominance of the right to autonomy and dignity. This right was suffi-
ciently important to justify departure in some unspecified way from an
unspecified causation principle.
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 See Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital NHS Trust [2004] 1 AC 309 where (by a
majority) the House of Lords awarded a ‘conventional sum’ of £15,000 in respect of what
might be termed ‘autonomy damage’, in the form of negligent interference with the
claimant’s right to self-determination. Lord Steyn (in the minority) did not accept the valid-
ity of this award. Lord Hope joined Lord Steyn in dissent: this aspect of Chester is discussed
by S Bailey, ‘Three Puzzles About Tort Causation’, paper delivered to the Torts Subject
Section, Society of Legal Scholars Conference, University of Keele, September 2006.
 Lord Steyn referred with approval to the analysis of T Honoré, ‘Medical Non-
Disclosure, Causation and Risk: Chappel v Hart’ (1999) 7 Torts Law Journal 1–8. As
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The nature of the duty: Lord Hoffmann’s dissent
Lord Hoffmann, by contrast, primarily emphasized the welfare or risk
avoidance version of the duty, which would more typically be associated
with the tort of negligence.
[28] . . . the purpose of a duty to warn someone against the risk involved in what
he proposes to do, or allow to be done to him, is to give him the opportunity to
avoid or reduce that risk. If he would have been unable or unwilling to take that
opportunity and the risk eventuates, the failure to warn has not caused the dam-
age. It would have happened anyway.
Without the last sentence, Lord Hoffmann would have correctly stated
the problem that arises if the duty is a duty to warn. Unfortunately, the
final sentence is incorrect, as demonstrated by Jane Stapleton. But it is
also an unnecessary addition.
On the facts of this particular case, it is not true that the damage would
have happened anyway. The occurrence of the damage was a remote risk
which would have attached to the surgery conducted on any given occa-
sion. Had the claimant delayed surgery, then with hindsight (which is
how we apply the ‘but for’ test), the damage would not have occurred any-
way. What Lord Hoffmann could equally effectively have said is that ‘the
risk would have been the same anyway’. This would have been correct,
and it would have made his point equally effectively. The point of the
duty is to avoid the risk (or allow the risk to be avoided). The duty was
breached; but on the facts the risk would not have been avoided if the
‘warning’ had been given.
This is precisely why Tony Honoré thought that a similar breach of
duty in a similar case in Australia had not caused the injury—though he
saw perfectly clearly that the ‘but for’ test was satisfied. (A distinction
between the two cases is that in Chappel v Hart, it is possible that the
patient could, if aware of the risk, have chosen a slightly more experienced
surgeon, and thus perhaps might have reduced the risk to some minor
degree). It is a hallmark of the Hart and Honoré approach to causation
that the ‘but for’ test is not seen as a sufficient test by which to identify
‘causes’. It only identifies ‘conditions precedent’, and not all of these
Jenny Steele316
explained below, Honoré identifies the causal problem with the fact that the risk of harm
was not increased.
 See J Stapleton, ‘Occam’s Razor Reveals An Orthodox Basis for Chester v Afshar’,
above at n 36.
 See Honoré, above at n 51, commenting on Chappel v Hart 195 CLR 232.
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deserve the name ‘cause’. This case could be taken to suggest that Hart
and Honoré had a point in this respect. The ‘but for’ test is satisfied, but
in such an unsatisfying way that the mind tends to reject the conclusion
that this is the case. Given that the ‘but for’ test is satisfied, it seems intu-
itively that something from the idea of a ‘cause’ is still missing. The ques-
tion is whether that ‘something’ flows from general ideas inherent in the
language of ‘causation’; or from the nature and purpose of the duty that
was breached. Is it a linguistic or a legal ‘something’?
According to Honoré, a failure to warn that does not increase risk is
simply not a cause of the damage that follows. Saying otherwise is not a
‘modest adjustment’ to causal principles. It is setting aside causation from
the breach as a requirement. This is very important because it illustrates
that a solution which appears to have been favoured by Lord Walker and
(possibly) by Lord Hope is not available if one accepts Honoré’s argument
(as, it appears, they did). One cannot evade the absence of factual
causation—and Honoré proposes that it is absent—by stepping sideways
into legal causation. Legal analysis—whether in the form of analysis of
the scope of the duty or the scope of the risk, or not—has never been
intended to make up for absence of factual causation. It is therefore not
enough to say that the damage is ‘within the risk’ (a non-causal idea) if it
does not satisfy applicable causal tests. On the other hand, Honoré’s solu-
tion was to say that there should be strict liability (as opposed to liability
in negligence), not for the consequences of the breach of the duty to warn,
but for the consequences of the surgery, which had been carried out with-
out informed consent. This tends to suggest that the problem—that risk
had not been increased—is not entirely about the idea conveyed by the
word ‘cause’ (it is not entirely a linguistic ‘something’ that is missing),
since the role of risk is determined partly by the legal question that is
asked. If the tortious conduct is defined as ‘surgery without informed
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 H L A Hart and T Honoré, Causation in the Law (2nd edn) (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1985).
 See also the judgment of Lord Bingham, falling into the same trap.
 Lord Walker said (at para [94]) that: ‘[b]are “but for” causation is powerfully rein-
forced by the fact that the misfortune which befell the claimant was the very misfortune
which was the focus of the surgeon’s duty to warn’. The nature of Lord Hope’s approach is
less obvious. He suggested that beyond the ‘but for’ test, questions about causation ‘tend to
be issues of legal policy in disguise. They are better answered by asking whether, all things
considered, the defendant should be held liable for the harm which ensued or, on another
view, whether the harm was foreseeable as within the risk, or was within the scope of the
rule violated by the defendant’ (at para [85]). In the final analysis: ‘justice requires that Miss
Chester be afforded the remedy which she seeks, as the injury which she suffered at the
hands of Mr Afshar was within the scope of the very risk which he should have warned her
about . . .’ ([88]).
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consent’, rather than ‘careless failure to obtain consent’, Honoré would
appear to agree that there is no causation problem.
We can clarify this further through attention to Lord Hoffmann’s
alternative formulation of the duty in this case. Lord Hoffmann also
considered the thinking that should apply if the duty is not a welfare duty
(to allow the claimant to avoid the risks), but (rather as Lord Steyn
decided, influenced in part by Honoré) to ensure that the patient’s auton-
omy is respected. On this interpretation, the purpose of the duty is to
ensure that it is genuinely the claimant who makes the decision. Here,
Lord Hoffmann seems to have assumed (at paras [32]–[34]) that the only
damage which falls ‘within the scope’ of such a duty is the violation of
autonomy itself and feelings associated with that violation—not its further
consequences. This of course makes a very significant difference to the
harm in respect of which damages are recoverable.
[32] . . . On ordinary principles of tort law the defendant is not liable. The remain-
ing question is whether a special rule of liability should be created by which doc-
tors who fail to warn patients of risks should be insurers against those risks.
[33] The argument for such a rule is that it vindicates the patient’s right to choose
for herself. Even though the failure to warn did not cause the patient any damage,
it was an affront to her personality and this leaves her feeling aggrieved.
[34] I can see that there might be a case for a modest solatium in such cases. But
the risks which may eventuate will vary greatly in severity and I think there would
be great difficulty in fixing a suitable figure. In any case, the cost of litigation over
such cases would make the law of torts an unsuitable vehicle for distributing the
modest compensation which might be payable.
Lord Hoffmann here divides the autonomy damage from the personal
injury itself. He reasons that the breach of duty did not cause the per-
sonal injury, but it that did violate the right to choose. He appears pre-
pared to accept that the vindication of rights may be possible through
negligence law,	 but he treats that possibility as a very different matter
from protecting welfare. Lord Hoffmann assumes that damages for this
element of what the doctor has done—the element that was wrong,
which was not exposure to risk—would be modest.
If there is ‘damage’ to the ‘autonomy interest’, why is it assumed that
recoverable damage does not extend to consequential personal injury? As
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 See S Bailey, ‘Three Puzzles About Tort Causation’, Paper delivered to the Torts
Subject Section, Society of Legal Scholars Conference, University of Keele, 2006.
	 Notably, Lord Steyn in the majority also used the language of ‘vindication’—but
thought a vindication of the autonomy right required an award of damages in respect of the
physical injury.
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we saw by reference to Honoré’s solution, there is no difficulty in proving
that the personal injury is caused by the breach of autonomy duty, since
protection from risk plays no part in the duty. The breach of this duty (to
respect autonomy) leads to the surgery on a given day. That surgery, on
that day, should not have taken place because it was conducted without
consent. It leads to personal injury. Because the question of causation is
now whether the surgery led to the harm—not whether the breach led to
a greater exposure to risk—it seems obvious that the test of factual caus-
ation is satisfied. The law is asking a different causal question. Only ‘duty
analysis’ justifies the restriction of damages to ‘autonomy damage’. It is by
no means clear that the consequences covered by the duty should be so
limited. They are not so limited in the trespass torts, it seems, where it is
accepted that consequential physical injuries are recoverable.

Lord Hoffmann’s dissent can be used to focus our minds on the real
problems in this case, in a way that is not achieved by the majority judg-
ments. First, what are the protected interests in negligence, and how far
from safety and welfare can they comfortably go? Second, what is the right
measure of damages for breach of an autonomy duty, where that breach
leads to consequential harm? Can it really be said that the injury suffered
here was ‘outside’ the scope of the duty, just because it was an autonomy
duty? If so, then the appropriate measure of damages in the trespass torts
has almost certainly been totally misunderstood. It has generally been
assumed that all direct consequences of a trespass will be compensated. In
fact, trespass torts might better capture the ‘gist’ of this case—not exposure
to risk, but failure to respect the right to decide which risks to undergo (and
when). Lord Hoffmann’s analysis was original whether seen in terms of neg-
ligence or of trespass. ‘Scope of duty’ analysis is successful in explaining the
problems in this case. But it is not successful at providing a knock-down
argument as to its solution. There is no such argument to be provided.
Conclusion: Chester v Afshar
Chester v Afshar draws our attention to the connection between negligence
and ‘safety’, and thus also risk. The whole range of criteria applicable to an
action in negligence can be seen to make most sense through analysis in
Recent Encounters between Negligence and Risk 319

 There may however be the different problem, noted by Lord Hoffmann, that the
surgery is innocently carried out by a person who was not the one who carelessly failed to
advise. The ‘wrong person’ may be liable. This is, in fact, a recognized hazard of trespass to
the person. See the discussion in Chatterton v Gerson [1980] 3 WLR 1003, 1012–13.
 Here, the damage was foreseeable (though unlikely), and there is no need to depend
on a directness test.
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respect of risks of harm. Certainly Chester shows the importance of duty.
But it also shows the importance of the relationship between duty and
damage. For this reason, one might question whether the abandonment of
the language of ‘scope of duty’ is really so desirable. On the other hand, we
can agree that such analysis cannot provide a fully logical (and non-
evaluative) path to the answers on recoverable damage. That is important
to bear in mind in connection with Barker v Corus, where Lord Hoffmann
can be said to have delivered the lead—and very surprising—judgment,
which purported to be an exercise in logic and fairness.
Barker v Corus
Barker v Corus shows the connection between duty, causation, and dam-
age in an entirely different way. Though generally perceived to be a case
about proving the causal link between breach and damage, the solution
adopted by Lord Hoffmann for the majority displays a ground-breaking
redefinition of actionable damage. Less obviously, this in turn may be
linked to an integrated approach to duty and damage.
Chester was a case where the breach did not increase a risk. By contrast,
Barker, like Fairchild v Glenhaven before it, is a case where all that can be
established on balance of probabilities is that the defendant’s breach of
duty did increase the risk and, importantly, that the claimant (or, in the
case of the Fatal Accidents Act claims, the deceased) did contract the dis-
ease to which this risk relates. Since the disease (a fatal cancer not
enhanced in its severity by cumulative exposures) is indivisible, is it
enough to show that the risk of contracting the cancer is increased by the
defendant’s breach?
Barker purported to extend the logic of an earlier case, Fairchild v
Glenhaven [2003] 1 AC 32. But describing what Fairchild decided is
more fraught with difficulty after Barker. As we have said, Barker v Corus
was swiftly reversed as to its effect by legislation, so far as mesothelioma is
concerned (Compensation Act 2006, s 3), following intense political
pressure. But even so the law now has to work around the majority’s inter-
pretation not just of Fairchild itself but also of McGhee v National Coal
Board ((1973) 1 WLR 1), on which Fairchild was based in turn. It also
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 Both Lord Walker and Lord Scott expressed agreement with Lord Hoffmann’s
reasons, even though they added some reasons of their own. Baroness Hale reached the
same conclusion on other grounds. The judgment was surprising both in relation to its
originality in the context of personal injury or disease, and in the fact that it was not based
on counsel’s argument, adopting a solution which counsel expressly did not propose.
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adds a new ‘isolated’ example of recovery for risk, rather than damage, to
the common law, whether or not there are any other diseases (outside
section 3) to which the interpretation will continue to apply in practice.
The background: Fairchild v Glenhaven
In Fairchild v Glenhaven, a number of claimants (or in some cases their
deceased husbands) had contracted mesothelioma. Mesothelioma is a
fatal cancer with a very long latency period. The only known cause of
mesothelioma is exposure to asbestos dust. On the interpretation of its
aetiology accepted in this litigation, it is undeniably an ‘indivisible’ dis-
ease, since it may be caused by exposure to a small number of asbestos
fibres and perhaps even by a single fibre. Once the fateful exposure has
occurred—and there is no way of identifying on which occasion this
has happened—no further exposure will worsen or aggravate the disease.
All that can be said is that each exposure adds to the risk that the disease
will be contracted.
In Fairchild, the House of Lords concluded unanimously, but for a
variety of different reasons, that it would be sufficient in these particular
circumstances to show that exposure on the part of any given defendant
had materially contributed to the risk of contracting the disease. This was
the only thing the claimants could show. It was sufficient to deal with the
appeal. The subsequent case of Barker was more testing, and a detailed
analysis of Fairchild was needed to dispose of it.
Why Barker was more challenging
One reason why Barker v Corus was a more testing case was that not all of
the relevant exposures to asbestos dust were in breach of duty. Indeed in
one of the appeals, the claimant had also been exposed to asbestos dust
during a period of self-employment, and during this period he had
shown no greater regard for his own safety than had employers during
Recent Encounters between Negligence and Risk 321
 Lord Hoffmann said that recovery for risk was not unsupported by authority in the
law of negligence. He mentioned the well-known example of recovery for lost chance of
financial gain. In addition, when assessing damages for the lost chance of future income (in
personal injury or dependency claims, for example), assessment of damages to represent
the lost chance of future income is also entirely familiar: Davies v Taylor [1974] AC 207;
Brown v Ministry of Defence [2006] EWCA Civ 546. Barker, despite its reversal, will assist
those seeking to interpret these as examples of a more general principle.
 See C Miller, ‘Causation in Personal Injury: Legal or Epidemiological Common
Sense?’ (2006) 26(4) Legal Studies 544–69.
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other periods. At first instance, applying Fairchild, Moses J saw this as a
reason for reducing damages on grounds of contributory negligence. He
did not consider that it otherwise affected the claim.
A second testing issue raised in Barker, and not addressed in Fairchild,
was the amount of damages recoverable. Should each defendant be liable
in full for the fatal cancer itself, subject to contribution proceedings
against other tortfeasors? Since the cancer is clearly ‘indivisible damage’
(as, still more obviously, is the death of a husband for the purposes of the
Fatal Accidents Act 1976), joint and several liability would be the usual
solution. In the courts below, this was the solution adopted. Each defend-
ant was liable in full, subject to reduction in damages for contributory
negligence. A liable party was of course free, as a matter of law, to bring
contribution proceedings against any other tortfeasor who had (in the
language of the contribution legislation) caused ‘the same damage’.
On both issues—the impact of the non-tortious exposures, and the
question of quantum—the exact basis of the decision in Fairchild became
crucial.
The decision in Fairchild: two interpretations
In Fairchild, Lords Bingham and Rodger said that proof that the defendant
had made a material contribution to the risk of the disease was sufficient in
such a case to count as proof of causation. This rested on an interpretation
and application of the decision in McGhee v National Coal Board. Lords
Hoffmann and Nicholls in Fairchild expressed the matter differently. Lord
Hoffmann said that the ordinary rules of causation were being varied for
reasons of justice and fairness. It may be wondered how this is compatible
with his dissent in Chester. There, he said that it made no logical sense to
call the breach a ‘cause’ of the damage. How can causation be a matter of
logic in Chester but a matter of justice and fairness in Fairchild ?
The answer again lies in the role of duty in connection with causation
of damage. We have already seen that Lord Hoffmann treated the relevant
duty in Chester as (primarily) a duty to warn. The goal of a duty to warn
is to allow the risk to be avoided. It was on this basis that it was illogical to
treat the breach as causing the injury. The risk would not have been
avoided (though as it happens the damage would) if the doctor had given
appropriate notice of the risk. In Fairchild too, the duty was expressed by
Lord Hoffmann in terms of risk: it was a duty to protect employees from the
risk of asbestos-related disease. This duty would be ‘emptied of content’ if
Jenny Steele322
 Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, s 1(1).
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there was no liability because of evidential problems. Those evidential
problems would always arise in any case of mesothelioma where there was
more than one employer.
Lord Hoffmann was using an integrated approach to duty and caus-
ation of damage in Fairchild, just as he had previously done in Chester,
and would subsequently do in Barker:
[54] If I may repeat what I have said on another occasion, one is never simply
liable, one is always liable for something—to make compensation for damage, the
nature and extent of which is delimited by the law . . .
Importantly, Lord Hoffmann also made clear that this is illustrated by the
familiar process through which the existence of a duty of care is addressed
in novel cases:
[55] In the law of negligence, in particular, it has long been recognised that the
imposition of a duty of care in respect of particular conduct depends on whether
it is fair, just and reasonable to impose it. Over vast areas of conduct one can gen-
eralize about the circumstances in which it will be considered just and reasonable
to impose a duty of care . . . But there are still circumstances where Lord Atkin’s
generalisation cannot be fairly applied and in which it is necessary to return to the
underlying principle and inquire whether it would be just and reasonable to
impose liability and what its nature and extent should be: see Caparo v Dickman
[1990] 2 AC 605.
It is notable that Lord Hoffmann describes this process (in the final
sentence) in terms of whether ‘to impose liability’ (rather than ‘to impose
a duty’). The very existence of a duty of care is determined partly by
considering whether it is fair to impose liability—and if so, what its
nature and extent should be. This illustrates that being under a duty to
take care does not mean only that one should take care. It says something
about the consequences should there be breach—and the decision
whether such a duty exists (and what it is) is determined partly by refer-
ence to these consequences. It is compatible with the judgment of Lord
Macmillan in Donoghue v Stevenson, which we quoted at the start.
With hindsight, Lord Hoffmann’s interpretation of the duty in
Fairchild also appears significant. He argued (at para [61]) that ‘we are
dealing with a duty specifically intended to protect employees against
being unnecessarily exposed to the risk of (amongst other things) a par-
ticular disease’. Further, ‘the policy of common law and statute’ was ‘to
protect employees against the risk of contracting asbestos-related diseases’
(para [63]). The duty is a duty to protect against risk. Later, in Barker, this
interpretation of the duty was implicated in the novel step that was taken.
The risk was interpreted as the relevant damage.
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McGhee: what did it mean (in Fairchild )?
To understand Fairchild more fully, we have to take one further step back
in time. As we have said, the House of Lords decided Fairchild partly in
reliance on McGhee v National Coal Board (1973) 1 WLR 1. But members
of the House did not express their views about McGhee in identical terms
in Fairchild. Later, in Barker, Lord Hoffmann argued that the true mean-
ing of McGhee can be gleaned from the much later case of Fairchild:
McGhee is an application of Fairchild ‘avant la lettre’ (para [13]). This
clearly hints at the fact that McGhee has been reinterpreted. But this
reinterpretation was not effected by the unanimous House of Lords in
Fairchild, as Lord Hoffmann argues. It was effected later by a majority of
the House in Barker itself.
Let us look particularly at the formulations of McGhee adopted by
Lords Bingham and Rodger on the one hand; Lords Hoffmann and
Nicholls on the other, in Fairchild v Glenhaven.
Fairchild on McGhee: Lords Bingham and Rodger
Lord Hoffmann argued in Barker that Lord Rodger had been alone, in
Fairchild, in his interpretation of McGhee. But this is not the case—
Lord Bingham’s interpretation was very similar to lord Rodger’s. Since
Lord Hutton took a wholly different approach to McGhee, the House in
Fairchild was evenly split between what, in Barker, became the ‘Rodger’
(dissenting) and the ‘Hoffmann’ (majority) view of McGhee.
In Fairchild, Lord Bingham identified the proposition in McGhee as
follows:
in the circumstances no distinction was to be drawn between making a material
contribution to causing the disease and materially increasing the risk of the pur-
suer contracting it.
The necessary causal connection sought in McGhee was material contribu-
tion to damage. That is the ‘normal’ requirement in cases derived from
Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw ([1956] AC 613). On Lord Bingham’s
analysis, this test remains the same in Fairchild. Did the breach of duty
materially contribute to the damage? If it did, the defendant has ‘caused’ the
damage. Thus, each defendant whose breach has materially contributed to
Jenny Steele324
 Lord Hutton argued that liability in McGhee was founded on drawing a factual infer-
ence ‘in a common sense way’, not on a principle of law (Fairchild v Glenhaven at para [97]).
 Lord Bingham, ibid, at para [21].
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the damage will have caused ‘the same damage’ (within the terms of s 1(1)
Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978), and contribution proceedings
between parties in breach will be possible.
In this case, however, all that can be shown is that the defendant’s breach
materially increased the risk. The crucial step taken by both Lord Bingham,
and Lord Rodger, is to interpret McGhee as saying that as a matter of law,
and in the circumstances, no distinction between material increase in risk,
and material contribution to damage, is to be drawn. Materially increasing
risk in these circumstances is the same as materially contributing to the dis-
ease. As Lord Bingham put it at para [35]: ‘the ordinary approach to proof
of causation is varied . . .’. The required causal connection remains the same.
What is varied is the approach to proof of this causal connection.
Lord Rodger’s approach in Fairchild was very similar to Lord
Bingham’s and it is consistent with the language used in McGhee itself—
thus undermining Lord Hoffmann’s claim that it is Fairchild, rather than
Barker, which adopted a new interpretation of McGhee.
Writing extra-judicially about the Fairchild decision, Lord Hope has
explained Lord Rodger’s interpretation of McGhee as follows. Lord Hope
was junior counsel for the Coal Board in McGhee itself. He recognizes that
decision as being correctly encapsulated by Lords Rodger and Bingham (and
not by Lords Hoffmann and Nicholls) in Fairchild. It is the test for proof of
causation, not the relevant causal connection, which is being redefined.
As Lord Rodger explained, what Lord Reid has done [in McGhee] is to accept that
the pursuer must prove that the defender’s conduct materially contributed to the
onset of the condition and then to hold, as a matter of law, that proof that the
defender’s conduct materially increased the risk was sufficient for this onus to be
discharged. You will not find the same interpretation in the speeches of Lord
Nicholls of Birkenhead or Lord Hoffmann. . . . I respectfully agree with Lord
Bingham and Lord Rodger that a new principle of law was decided in
McGhee. . . . the test for proof of causation is satisfied by showing a material
increase in the risk of injury.
Fairchild on McGhee: Lords Hoffmann and Nicholls
Lord Hoffmann in Fairchild took a different approach. Like Lord
Bingham, he thought it inappropriate to adopt a ‘fiction’. But he regarded
the solution above (treating a material increase in risk as if it made a material
contribution to the disease) as just such a fiction. So the new proposition of
law that Lord Hoffmann derived from McGhee was different from the one
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Cambridge Law Journal 587–604, 599.
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derived by Lords Bingham and Rodger. It skips the ‘material contribution’
aspect altogether:
the House [in McGhee] treated a material increase in risk as sufficient in the
circumstances to satisfy the causal requirements for liability.
It is the causal requirement itself which has been altered. In Fairchild, Lord
Hoffmann described this as fair and just because (quoting Lord
Wilberforce) the creator of the risk—as between creator and employee—
should bear the consequences of the impossibility of proof. Later, in
Barker, Lord Hoffmann clearly thought he had done enough by way of
favouring the claimant. The different risk, of insolvency or of untraceable
defendants, should be borne by the employee.
Lord Nicholls too by-passed ‘material contribution’ and explained that
a lesser causal connection was being required. In McGhee, he argued, the
House had decided that ‘a less stringent causal connection was sufficient’
(Fairchild v Glanhaven, at para [44]). The court was not inferring that the
usual ‘material contribution’ test is satisfied. Rather, ‘the court is applying
a different and less stringent test’ (Fairchild v Glenhaven, at para [45]).
Barker itself
In Barker, the House unanimously affirmed its commitment to McGhee
as the basis of Fairchild. The Fairchild exception was not dependent on all
the exposures being tortious. McGhee was a case where the cause might
have been not tortious. Therefore, the presence of non-tortious exposures
would not defeat Fairchild. But in respect of apportionment, the major-
ity of the House of Lords fashioned an argument of its own (not put to it
by counsel for the defendant employers and their insurers) which reinter-
preted the meaning of both McGhee and Fairchild.
It could be established, as a matter of evidence, only that the employer
had caused an increase in the risk of harm. Lord Hoffmann—with whom
Lords Scott and Walker agreed as to the reasoning (and Baroness Hale in
the result on other grounds)—held that the damages recoverable only
extended to exactly that: the increased risk of harm, caused by the defend-
ant. Instead of shifting the risk of damage by making a negligent party pay
for that damage, if the risk eventuates, the recoverable harm is only the
risk itself. A revolutionary step in the definition of the duty and of the
recoverable damage has been taken, in response to the difficulties of
proof. This step could not be taken without an integrated approach to
duty, causation, and recoverable damage; but it is not in any sense
compelled by the integrated approach.
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It should be made clear that this solution is not the same as propor-
tionate liability for damage.	 It is, strictly, full liability for the damage
caused by the defendant’s breach of duty. But that damage is now said to
be something other (and less) than the fatal disease itself. Recoverable
damage within the breach is now said to be the increase in risk to which
the claimant was subjected. Duty and damage are as important as causal
criteria in this solution.
Lord Hoffmann’s solution in Barker: three stages 
in the reasoning
How did Lord Hoffmann in particular reason to this novel solution? We
can isolate three stages in the reasoning.
The first stage is the interpretation of McGhee, as unconnected to
‘material contribution to damage’. As discussed above, McGhee is inter-
preted as adopting (where it applies) a wholly new approach, by which
increase in risk is sufficient causal connection. We have already said that
this interpretation of McGhee cannot be clearly derived from Fairchild,
where there was an even division of opinion. This contested step is crucial
to the apparent logic of the Barker decision. If increase in risk is the causal
connection, then liability may be for increase in risk. If on the other hand
the causal connection is material contribution to the injury suffered, and
evidence of increase in risk is merely treated as sufficient to prove this con-
nection, then it makes no sense at all to say that the injury caused is an
increase in risk. The injury ‘caused’ (once we have applied the relaxed test)
would most surely be the disease (or death) itself.
If the first stage of the reasoning adopted a debatable interpretation of
precedent (McGhee), the second appealed to logic, in the form of ‘consist-
ency of approach’. Now that the ‘basis of liability’ is said to be the creation
of risk of disease (stage 1), it is said to be consistent to hold that the dam-
age which the defendant should be regarded as having caused is the cre-
ation of this risk:
[35] Consistency of approach would suggest that if the basis of liability is the
wrongful creation of a risk or chance of causing the disease, the damage which the
defendant should be regarded as having caused is the creation of such a risk or
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	 Porat and Stein argued (before Barker) that the House of Lords in a Fairchild-type
case should adopt proportionate liability, applying the solution in Holtby and Allen (above
n 17): see A Porat and A Stein, ‘Indeterminate Causation and Apportionment of Damages:
An Essay on Holtby, Allen, and Fairchild’ (2003) 23(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies
667–702. The House of Lords realized that a more radical departure from orthodox ana-
lysis was required to effect the same result, given the indivisible nature of the injury.
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chance. If that is the right way to characterise the damage, then it does not matter
that the disease as such would be indivisible damage. Chances are infinitely divis-
ible and different people can be separately responsible to a greater or lesser degree
for the chances of an event happening, in the way that a person who buys a whole
book of tickets in a raffle has a separate and larger chance of winning the prize
than a person who has bought a single ticket.
‘Chances are infinitely divisible’, unlike fatal cancer. This approach is
designed to avoid the conclusion that all those who have (as a matter of
law) ‘caused’ the damage are jointly and severally liable for the disease. In
this way, the majority attempted to leap free of liability ‘in solidum’ for an
indivisible disease.
On an important point of detail, this approach certainly will not work
for claims brought under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976. That statute
requires that death must be caused by the ‘wrongful act, neglect or default’
which forms the basis of the claim (section 1(1)). No claim can be
brought under this Act where the defendant has merely caused the ‘risk’
of death. As such, if the solution of the majority is taken literally, it means
that the form of damage caused by the defendant is (for dependents) not
one that can be the basis of a claim. This does not seem to have been
intended.
In fact, it is very difficult to take the solution (whereby the ‘damage’ is
now exposure to risk) entirely at face value. It is expressed as being bound
by two arbitrary limitations. First, it applies only where the disease in
question (the risk of which has been increased by the defendant) has actu-
ally been suffered. It has no application to a case where the disease may or
may not be suffered in the future. No reason is given for this qualification.
As a matter of principle, it is then very difficult to maintain that the rule
aligns the quantum of damage with ‘the basis of liability’. If the approach
is justified only where the claimant has actually suffered the disease, it
would seem to be disease, rather than creation of risk, that is the key con-
cern after all and which is thus ‘the basis’ of liability. ‘Risk’ is only a step
on the way. The second arbitrary limitation is the ‘single agent’ rule
which, it has been convincingly argued, has no basis in principle and is
simply applied to keep Fairchild and Barker within narrow limits.
 This
brings us to the third stage in the reasoning.
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
 See C Miller, ‘Causation in Personal Injury: Legal or Epidemiological Common
Sense?’ (2006) 26(4) Legal Studies 544–69. The ‘single agent’ rule maintains that Fairchild
(and McGhee) applies only where it is established that the injury was caused by one par-
ticular agent (asbestos or coal dust, in these cases), even if it is not known whether the
exposure which caused the injury was tortious. This distinguishes Wilsher v Essex Area
Health Authority [1988] 1 AC 1974.
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The third stage concerns fairness. This was indeed expressed by Lord
Hoffmann to be the prime consideration: ‘the important question is
whether such a characterisation would be fair . . .’ (at para [40]).
What then amounts to fairness in this case? The fairness argument in
Fairchild was simple, and it echoed some comments of Lord Wilberforce
in McGhee itself. The consequence of impossibility of proof should not be
laid at the door of the claimant, but should rest with the defendant. But
in McGhee, there was only one party in breach. In Fairchild and Barker
there are several parties in breach. This factor makes a difference in terms
of fairness only where the contribution legislation is ineffective. The main
reason why it might be substantially ineffective, in this context, is the risk
of insolvency. A subsidiary reason is the difficulty of tracing relevant par-
ties. Apart from these factors, a liable party (after seeking contribution)
would be no more exposed to risk beyond the damage it actually caused
than it was in McGhee. As such, the true rationale for Barker in terms of
fairness seems to be settled by the arguments in para [46]. If a particular
solvent defendant is held liable for the full amount suffered by the
claimant:
. . . he will in effect be the guarantor of the liability of those who are not traceable
or solvent and, as time passes, the number of these will grow larger . . .
The arguments of ‘fairness’ operating against the claimants in this case 
are not about the relationship between the two parties at all. They are
based on past and future claims experience and engage the practical inef-
fectiveness, in the context of this particular industrial disease, of the con-
tribution legislation. Here, the question is, should these other ‘risks’ (the
risks of insolvency and of untraceable parties, not of disease) lie on the
claimant, or on the parties in breach?
The problems created for claimants by the decision in Barker were
problems of under-compensation created by insolvency and of untrace-
able defendants. The burden of finding each and every employer and
insurer now lay with the claimants. Theirs was the burden of proving
employment and (where relevant) insurance in respect of all periods of
exposure, and the burden of the substantial risk of insolvency. It would be
both rare and very expensive for any particular claimant to achieve full
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 Porat and Stein, above at n 68, adopt a proportionate version of Lord Wilberforce’s
argument. They argue that the problem is evidential: causation cannot be proven. The bur-
den of this evidential uncertainty—which can be assessed proportionately in terms of the
likelihood that the defendant caused the claimant’s injury—should lie on the defendant,
who breached the duty.
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compensation (whether for their own fatal disease or the death of a
relevant party), whatever the merits of their case.
Conclusions: Barker v Corus
I have suggested that the argument about the ‘basis of liability’ under
Fairchild and McGhee was unconvincing. In addition, the approach to
‘increased risk’ as damage was not compelled by ‘duty analysis’ or ‘risk
analysis’, but actually amounted to a radical departure from the normal
practice of risk analysis and allocation. The decision must therefore be
evaluated in the end in terms of its fairness. Is the burden on claimants
(certain under-compensation) really outweighed, in terms of pure ‘fair-
ness’, by the problem for solvent defendants (excessive liability)? Getting
the liability sum ‘right’ by reference to a share of the risk created will
inevitably mean getting the compensation sum ‘wrong’. Lord Rodger’s
argument—that this fairness argument is novel and hard to justify on the
basis of the data to hand—is compelling. Barker does not hold a balance
between claimants and defendants as it purports to do but dramatically
switches the priority from compensation for personal injury (the trad-
itional concern of a damage-based approach to the law of negligence), to
concern with overall liability levels and their distribution among a shrink-
ing number of defendants. Does this case show the influence on the judi-
cial imagination of ill-defined threats such as compensation culture or
insurance crisis?
There is reason to agree with Baroness Hale (in the majority) and Lord
Rodger (in dissent) that Barker must be judged above all as a policy deci-
sion. Parliament obviously took a different view of the policy position.
Notably, section 3 of the Compensation Act 2006 provides that liable
parties who cannot obtain contribution may, through regulations, be
provided with a degree of compensation in turn for their over-exposure to
liability. The Compensation Act 2006 (Contribution for Mesothelioma
Claims) Regulations 2006 make relevant amendments to the Financial
Services Compensation Scheme to allow this to happen. The legislative
scheme more clearly holds a balance between claimants and defendants
than the decision in Barker, even if it is (like the contribution legislation
itself ) tilted in favour of claimants.
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 C Ettinger, ‘The Impact of Barker v Corus (UK) Ltd in Mesothelioma Cases’, seminar
paper at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, ‘Barker v Corus—the
Emergence of a New Tort?’, 5 June 2006.
 See De Saulles, above at n 41.
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In re Pleural Plaques
The Pleural Plaques litigation is closely related to Barker both in the sense
that it affects the total exposure to liabilities for asbestos-related diseases,
and in the sense that it raises the question of liability for increased risk per
se. It also further illustrates a more protective approach to defendants (or
perhaps to the sources of compensation) in asbestos-related disease litiga-
tion. Here the Court of Appeal, by a majority, reversed the practice of
twenty years of paying modest compensation for the development of
pleural plaques. From start to finish, the majority of the Court of Appeal
explained all the elements of the decision as turning on ‘policy’. Smith LJ
in dissent disagreed directly with some of the policy findings.
The key issue in this case clearly concerns actionable damage. Here, the
question is when, in a personal injury action, a claimant can be said to be
suffering from damage sufficient to ground an action? The answer to this
question has a number of implications, including the question of when
the limitation period will start to run. If pleural plaques are actionable
damage, then the limitation period will begin to run when there is the
necessary knowledge of them (Limitation Act 1980, s 14). At the time of
Cartledge v Jopling [1963] AC 758, a case which exemplified the need for
fundamental change in the law of limitation, the period began to run
when the relevant injury occurred—even if it was not discoverable.
Although the Cartledge problem has been removed for undiscovered con-
ditions, there will still be a problem after the Court of Appeal decision in
advising claimants when they must proceed, since they must wait until
their injury is ‘material’. It was also accepted by the Court of Appeal that
there is only one action for each negligent act—even if further damage
later transpires. There are not separate tort actions dependent on new
damage. ‘Litigation should be final.’
The ‘damage’ suffered by the claimants was said to come in three
parts. First, they had suffered personal injury in the form of ‘pleural
plaques’. These take the form of internal tissue changes to the lungs and
are usually without symptoms (although in 1% of cases they can affect
lung function). They are typically discovered through x-ray exam-
ination. It appears to have been accepted by the claimants that although
these plaques were (they argued) physical injury, they were not sufficient
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 Smith LJ referred at paras [121] and [122] to Lord Reid in Cartledge v Jopling: a fur-
ther injury arising at a later date from the same wrongful act does not give rise to a further
cause of action.
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in themselves to ground an action. They did not amount to material
damage.
Second, these plaques are associated with an increased risk of contracting
pernicious asbestos-related diseases such as asbestosis and mesothelioma.
They do not cause such diseases nor develop into them. But pleural plaques
are known to be a ‘marker’ that the sufferer has been exposed to asbestos
in such quantities that the risk of these diseases is significantly raised. The
second component of the claim is therefore risk of future disease.
Third, the knowledge of suffering the plaques is the cause of anxiety,
because of the implications for future disease. It might be argued that this
anxiety is not entirely logical. Exposure to asbestos per se, not the presence
of these ‘markers’, should be the real source of concern. But the existence
of plaques exemplifies to the sufferer in no uncertain terms that their
lungs have been pierced by asbestos fibres; and that they are showing a
physical manifestation of the possibility of pernicious disease.
The claimants argued then that they had suffered personal injury
(plaques); and that their injury was actionable since it was not merely
‘trivial’. What made it not merely trivial was the addition of anxiety, and
risk of future disease. In one case (Grieves v Everard ) there was a fourth
component, in the form of depressive illness. This we know is capable of
being compensated in its own right (without personal injury), but the
majority nevertheless held that it was not recoverable in this case, because
the claimant’s illness was not foreseeable. This amounts to an argument
that the claimant had not shown sufficient ‘fortitude’. If he had, the ill-
ness would have been foreseeable. This is very hard to reconcile with the
decision in Page v Smith [1996] AC 155, which treated individuals who
are within the ‘zone of danger’ created by a breach of duty as ‘primary’ vic-
tims. The claimant here was clearly within a zone of danger, and is still at
risk of physical injury. In a primary victim case, the special control devices
applied to secondary victim claims and set out in Alcock v Chief Constable
Jenny Steele332
 Notably, pleural plaques are not by themselves a prescribed disease for the purposes
of industrial disablement benefit. In its Report of July 2005 (reviewing the prescription of
asbestos-related disease), the Industrial Injuries Advisory Council did not recommend any
change in the treatment of pleural plaques: ‘The Council recognises that symptomatic
pleural plaques can occur. However, there is a lack of evidence that they cause impairment
of lung function sufficient to cause disability. In civil litigation pleural plaques may attract
compensation, although this is generally for the psychological distress and for associated
risk of other asbestos-related disease.’ See Industrial Injuries Advisory Council, Report by
the IIAC in accordance with Section 171 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992
reviewing the prescription of the asbestos-related diseases (2005) Cm 6553, at para [73]. Note
that this relates to whether plaques cause disablement, rather than whether they can
amount to material injury.
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of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310 do not apply. It should particularly
be noted that the interpretation of ‘foreseeability’ with hindsight applied
in secondary victim cases is itself a control device.
While Page v Smith has been criticized for taking a restrictive approach
to the definition of primary victims, it seems that the majority of the
Court of Appeal in this case (Lord Phillips MR and Longmore LJ) disap-
proved rather of the claimant-friendly impact of Page v Smith in cases like
this, in that it took the step of treating psychiatric damage as genuinely a
form of personal injury. Extra-judicially, Lord Phillips has indeed said
that he disapproves of the suspension of control devices (particularly the
special meaning of foreseeability) in cases where the claimant is endan-
gered, but not physically injured: ‘If a claimant has not in fact sustained
such an injury, I do not see why he should be entitled to recover for psy-
chiatric injury which he has sustained because of a special susceptibility,
although a person of reasonable fortitude would not be affected.’ In
addition to the response to asbestos-related disease itself, this case also
therefore seems to reverse the trend toward treating damage to the mind
as truly equivalent to physical personal injury. By contrast in the case of
Corr v IBC [2006] 3 WLR 395, the majority of a differently constituted
Court of Appeal was content to rely on Page v Smith, and especially on the
way in which it identified depression as an element of personal injury, for
the purposes of foreseeability. This was a key step in the finding that
a claim could be sustained for death by suicide where this suicide was
the foreseeable result of depression experienced after a serious industrial
accident.
When taken together with the treatment of anxiety, the decision in the
Pleural Plaques litigation seems to adopt the sort of ‘priority’ of injuries
which had begun to be rejected as old-fashioned and unenlightened. But
here, and particularly in respect of anxiety rather than depression, the
idea of such a priority has a more immediate context. Arguably, the prob-
lem of insolvency noted in respect of Barker means that funds for com-
pensating asbestos-related diseases are limited, and likely to shrink, with
the peak in such claims shortly to come (between 2010 and 2020). There
is some urgency to the issue of prioritization. The question of priority
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 For recent analysis of the broadening range of cases which can be called ‘primary vic-
tim’ cases, see P Handford, ‘Psychiatric Injury in Breach of a Relationship’ (2007) 27 Legal
Studies 26–50.
 Page v Smith was criticized for this reason by Lord Goff in White v Chief Constable of
South Yorkshire Police [1999] 2 AC 455.
 Lord Phillips, ‘Liability for Psychiatric Injury’, Personal Injury Bar Association
Lecture, 23 November 2004.
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may be underscored by distributive concerns playing on the minds of the
judges. But that is not entirely what was said.
Rather, three separate policy heads were expressly identified by the
majority. Notably, these failed to address the claimants’ arguments about
a ‘mix’ of the three forms of ‘damage’ claimed, and did not adequately
explain why twenty years of practice in compensating for the existence of
plaques has been wrong. There were some more general arguments in
addition. These largely failed to address the wider distributive issue which
may explain the decision.
First, the argument that the plaques themselves are material physical
injury was defeated by the policy encapsulated in the principle ‘de min-
imis non curat lex’. ‘Trivial injuries’ should not be compensated. This does
not answer the claimants’ argument that taking the various elements
together, their injury is not trivial.
Second, the risk of future disease is not to be compensated because
with hindsight, any such award is certain to be wrong. This is unconvin-
cing in itself because the claimants could seek a provisional award if they
wished.	 If this should be done, they would be compensated for the two
other heads of damage, and could return for an assessment of damages
relating to the serious disease if this did eventuate. If instead they should
choose an immediate final award to reflect the risk of future disease,
 the
risk of being wrong is on them (and of course on their dependants). No
parallel risk falls on defendants as a class since over time, in this instance,
the right amount ought to be sought by all claimants for the disease, either
through early and partial payment, or through provisional awards where
the decision is left until a later date. There is no general over-exposure
problem caused by the ‘risk of future disease’ head. There is however an
issue surrounding the priority of claimants, if it should prove to be the
case that compensation funds are limited. But as in Barker, no concrete
evidence appears to have been advanced to establish whether such funds
are genuinely limited.
Third, anxiety is not to be compensated because of difficulties of proof
and of assessing the moment at which the action should arise. Again
this does not address the solution to this problem which is provided by
Jenny Steele334
	 Supreme Court Act 1981, s 32A.

 This award would itself be subject to deduction to reflect the fact that it was being
obtained early. In one of the cases, liability was admitted and the only question concerned
the correct approach to quantum. General damages in this case have subsequently been
assessed at £15,500 to include all elements of the claim including risk of future disease; the
pecuniary award has been assessed at £8,500 to represent the risk of future loss, plus £2,000
to reflect the risk of needing nursing services and equipment: Hindson v Pipe Wharf House
(Swansea) Ltd (2007) EWHC 273 (QB).
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integrating the claims. The difficulty of assessing the moment at which
the action should arise is resolved by knowledge of the plaques. Therefore,
this policy reason is importantly supported by a separate argument, at
para [66]: why should those with plaques have the ‘privilege’ of a claim for
anxiety, which those without plaques (but clearly exposed to asbestos) do
not have? This gets much closer to the distributive question, of compen-
sation priority.
More general policy reasons against liability included the temptation
that might be placed on claimants to ‘gamble’ on an early final award; and
the inducement that would be provided to claims companies to go seek-
ing people with pleural plaques. If this occurred, the result would be to
create further anxiety which does not at present exist.
In dissent, Smith LJ argued that the plaques were themselves a physical
injury, and that this injury was not trivial because of its effects on the
claimant. The strongest argument deployed in support of this view was
undoubtedly a comparison with external scarring. Such scarring, Smith
LJ explained, is actionable when it has cosmetic effect, even if as here the
scar is in no sense disabling. In such a case, the action is allowed because
of the cosmetic effect and the impact on the mind of the claimant; but it
remains the case that the injury is the scar, not the effect on the mind.
Aggregation of effects is therefore quite normal. Is there an answer to this
compelling argument?
It is suggested that the only possible principled answer would require
an unpalatable distinction to be made between the claimants’ responses
to external and internal scarring, respectively. It might even require that
the anxiety experienced by the claimants in this case should be treated as
‘unreasonable’. There seems no convincing reason to adopt this view of
their understandable response. It seems preferable to confess that the
distributive concerns noted above led the majority into this distinction.
The decision reached in this litigation will affect the order in which
claims for asbestos-related disease are satisfied. It will also lead to delay in
payments to some of those who are at risk of future disease in order to
bring their position into line with those without plaques. If the treatment
of Grieves itself stands, there will be no payments for actual depressive
illnesses caused by the knowledge of risk, because it is regarded as unfore-
seeable. The key concern perhaps is whether the policy arguments articu-
lated by the court are really the only ones that are operating. If the
decision is driven by distributive concerns, the reality of those concerns
surely needs to be tested.
In cases of asbestos-related disease, the relevant breaches of duty are in
the past, but many of the claims are in the future. The problem is one of
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compensation. As Barker v Corus identified, most of the payments will
come from a limited and shrinking pool of insurers and employers.	 Is it
right to think about fairness in a different way in these cases? Are we more
concerned with the source, scale, and timing of compensation for those in
need, than with blame and corrective justice? If so, the apparent trend
against claimants is incidental.	 The real trend is in favour of protection
of defendants and perhaps the broader common interest.
Conclusions
The cases considered here all illustrate the importance of the compen-
satory function of the tort of negligence. And they also illustrate different
challenges to that compensatory function. In Chester v Afshar, the chal-
lenge is whether the tort of negligence can protect new interests (or, to put
it a slightly different way, protect against new ‘forms of damage’). The
unaddressed and vital question is the role of compensation for personal
injury, if the duty is to respect autonomy. Though Chester v Afshar may
suggest a new ‘vindicatory’ function for negligence the logical problems
created (though not fully articulated) by this case tend to illustrate the
central connection between negligence, and allocation of the risk of acci-
dental damage. In Barker and In re Pleural Plaques on the other hand, the
really serious questions are chiefly distributive. The ‘conceptual’ basis for
changing the type of damage in Barker—by redefining the risk—does not
convince.
As is well known, Glanville Williams was a champion of the ‘risk prin-
ciple’, which holds that recoverable damages in the tort of negligence are
defined by reference to the risk against which the claimant ought to have
been protected. But he recognized that the logic of this ought to give way
in certain respects where personal injury was concerned. ‘Human bodies
are too fragile, and life too precarious’, he suggested, to maintain ‘the cold
logical analysis’ of such cases.	 Williams had in mind the egg-shell skull
Jenny Steele336
	 In Re T & N [2006] EWHC 1447 (Ch) it was held that schemes reached by agree-
ment between liability insurers and administrators of an insured company, which effect-
ively withdraw liability insurance in respect of certain historical periods and therefore
remove the source of compensation for individuals employed during those periods, are
valid and do not breach the obligation to insure imposed by the Employers’ Liability
(Compulsory Insurance) Act 1969.
	 Though note the arguments of De Saulles, above at n 41, that claimants sometimes
are vilified through the terms in which ‘compensation culture’ is debated.
	 G Williams, ‘The Risk Principle’ (1961) 77 Law Quarterly Review 179, at 196.
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principle when he made these remarks, and he accepted the need for this
principle despite its incompatibility (in his view) with the development of
The Wagon Mound approach.
The risk principle, even in its Wagon Mound guise, was always an inte-
grated approach, and ‘scope of duty analysis’ updates this principle to an
era where the transfer of risk to defendants is in many cases thought to
require closer and more detailed justification. But Barker and In re Pleural
Plaques illustrate that Williams’ idea, that personal injury is different, is
now being dramatically qualified. This is occurring even in the industrial
context, where it might be thought to be at its strongest, since the risks
and benefits are clearly not reciprocal.
The reasons behind this are connected with the loss-spreading model of
tort. Funds are limited; third party insurance is a fallible mechanism;
potential claimants must compete with other collective and commercial
interests—and with each other. These are the sorts of issues explored within
the social welfare, risk spreading model of tort law .	The explanations will
not be found in the conceptual and ‘fairness’ arguments deployed, nor in
the more purely ‘normative’ approach to negligence duties.
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	 See Atiyah, at n 22 above, and Hepple, at n 20, above.
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